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Abstract
In Friedman and Samuelson (1990a), we showed that there exist subgame perfect
equilibria for infinitely repeated games in which the equilibrium strategy combinations are
rnntinuous. This paper extends these results by providing a munterpart to the Fudenberg and
Maskin folk theorem in rnntinuous strategies. We show that any outmme of the stage game
which is feasible and stridly individually rational can be supported as an outmme of a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the infini[ely repeated game with mntinuous strategies,
providing discount fadors are sufficiently high.
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In an earlier paper, Friedman and Samuelson (1990a), the authors showed that there
exist subgame perfect equilibria for infinitely repeated games in which the equilibrium strategy
mmbinations are mntinuous. These equilibria support payoff outrnmes dominating those
associated wi[h a single-shot nonmoperative equilibrium of the game. The equilibrium
strategies consist of an initial action and a rnntinuous decision rule for choosing actions in
later periods.
In Friedman and Samuelson (1990a) we argued that discontinuous dectision tules are
sometimes implausible. We do not take the position that they are always less plausible than
rnntinuous strategies, but only that some circumstances favor one, some the other. In that
spirit, this paper extends our earlier results by providing a munterpart to the Fudenberg and
Maskin folk theorem in which decision rules are mntinuous.
[t has long been known that outmmes that Pareto dominate a Nash equilibrium of the
stage game can be supported in infinitely repeated games by Nash revetsion trigger strategies.
Let s' denote the action rnmbination called for by an equilibrium strategy mmbination and s`
a single-shot Nash equilibrium action combination. Under a trigger strategy player i chooses
si if no deviation from s- has been enmuntered, but chooses s~ after any deviation. The
rnntinuous strategies in Friedman and Samuelson (1990a) are analogous to trigger strategy4
equilibria in two ways: the equilibrium payoffs dominate single-shot Nash payoffs and
deviations from equilibrium behavior draw a punishment that dces not depend on which
player deviates. The strategies of Friedman and Samuelson differ from trigger strategies in
that the latter are dismntinuous, prescribing the same punishment for all deviations from s'.
Im m~trast, the Friedman and Samuelson decision tules prescribe an action near s~ in response
to a small deviation and prescribe actions which move mntinuously nearer to s~ the larger the
deviation. These continuous decision tules are akin to the reaction functions of oligopoly
theory.
Discontinuous deásion rules also appear in the existing formulations of the folk
theorem for repeated games. In the discounted folk theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986), which is typical of results in the area, equilibrium strategy combinations are
mnstructed that (1) will support a given payoff outmme if it dominates the minimax payoffs
of the playets (i.e., if it is strictly individually rationa[), (2) are subgame perfect, (3) tailor
punishment for defection to the defecting player, and (4) are based on dismntinuous decision
rules. 1~e Fudenberg and Maskin equilibria differ from trigger strategy equilibria with respect
to (1) and (3), and also differ in requiring significantly more complicated strategies. Much of
this complication appears in order to tailor punishments to the identiry of the deviator who
has triggered the punishment.
In order to achieve a folk theorem, we will work in this paper with strategies that
share features (1) to (3) with the Fudenberg and Maskin strategies. In particular, our
s[ra[egies will yield subgame perfect equilibria that support (virtually) any payoff that is
strictly individually rational. Our strategies will also tailor punishmenu to the identity of the
deviator who triggets the punishment. This tailoring of the punishment to the defector
appears crucial to supporting arbitrary individually rational outcomes. However, our5
strategies are continuous, im m~trast to those of Fudenberg and Maskin.
Strategies in the folk theorem family generally utilize "reference points." These
reference points can be intuitively interpreted as indicating where the game is. For
(discontinuous) grim trigger strategy equilibria, the reference point takes on one of only two
values, indicating whether there has been prior defection.' The Fudenberg and Maskin folk
theorem requires a more rnmplicated reference point that indicates (1) whether there has
been a defection, (2) who is the most recent defector if there has been any defection, and (3)
how many periods in the past the most recent defection occurred. This information is needed
to determine the current period action prescribed by the equilibrium strategies.
In our previous work, we examined strategies that did not require a reference point
and also strategies requiring a scalar reference point ~, taking values in the interval [0, 1], to
indicate the level of punishment currently being carried out. Zero rnrresponded to the
maximal punishment and one rnrresponded to no punishment. As with trigger strategies, no
account was taken of whieh player defected.
To achieve a full folk theorem generalization with rnniinuous strategíes, this paper
abandons the scalar reference point in favor of a vector valued reference point of dimension n
t 1. The reference point vector is denoted ~-(~o, ~,,..., ~„). The fint mordinate (~~ has
the same meaning as our previous reference point and takes values in [0, 1], indicating the
current extent of coopera[ive óehavior with ~a - 1 being maximal cooperation and ~a - 0 being
the extreme of punishment. The remaining n mordinates (~,,..., ~„) designate the degree to
which the various players are current defectors. F~ ,~; - 1 at all times, meaning that there is a
nominal defector status across playets that always sums to unity. When the game begins,
(~,,..., S„) -(i~n,..., l~n), reflecting symmetry in the initial defector status.Z In any period
when no player defects (~,,..., ~„) is unchanged. If player i defects and ~, ~ 1, then ~, is6
increased and the remaining positive ~~ (j x i) are decreased in equal proportions to preserve
the total of unity. A maximal deviation by player i will cause ~, - 1 and ~~ - 0, j~ i. Similar
to Fudenberg and Maskin, if~o - 0 and ~, - 1 for some player i, then player i is being held to
his minimax payoff. As with our earlier fotmulation, if ~o ~ 1 and players foUow their
equilibrium strategies, then ~o will rise over time, mnverging to ~o - 1 in the limit.
We thus work with a reference point that mmbines features found in Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986) and Friedman and Samuelson (1990a). This allows us to combine
charaderistics of the Fudenberg and Maskin strategies, suppotting individually rational
payoffs, with characteristics of the Friedman and Samuelson strategies, yielding equilibria in
mntinuous strategies. The result is an extension of the follc theorem to subgame perfect
continuous strategies.
The sense in which our equilibrium strategies are rnntinuous deserves attention. In
Friedman and Samuelson (1990a) the decision tule of a player i selected the period t action
(s„) as a mntinuous function of either the action mmbination of the previous period (s,.,) or
the action mmbination and the reference point (s,.,, ~,.,). The equilibrium mnttudion is
illustrated in the payoff space shown in Figure 1. Equilibrium behavior called for selecting s'
at t- 0(for a payoff of P(s')) and at later times, given that no defections had ocxurred.
(place Figure 1 about here)
Defections then called for equilibrium choices, parameterized by ~, on the line connecting
single shot Nash payoffs P(s~ and P(s'). The smaller the defection the nearer the indicated
point would be to P(s~.
Not all games permit such decision rules, as Figure 2 illustrates. The resulu of
(place Figure 2 about here)
Friedman and Samuelson (1990a) require that the rnnnecting path from P(s~ to P(s~ must be7
upward sloping (though it need not be linear). The points P(s~ and either C or A in Figure 2
cannot be rnnnected by an upward sloping path mntained in the set of feasible payoffs. We
have been unable to develop general conditions under which such a connecting path can be
rnnstructed. We propose two routes around the problem.' One route, followed in Friedman
and Samuelson (1990b), is to investigate particular classes of games, such as duopolies, in
which the problem can be shown to be absent. The other mute, followed below, is to adopt
the standard mnvention of allowing the players to choose rnrrelated mixed actions (cf.
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)). in terms of Figure 1, this would give ~, the role of a
probabiliry distribution. When following their equilibrium decision rvles, the players would
choose a mrrelated mixed action placing probabiliry ~, on s' and 1-~, on s`. This paper uses
rnrrelated mixtures to develop a class of equilibria which is more general than the type
illustrated in Figure 1 and under whicb virtually any individually rational single shot payoff
vector can be supported.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The model is described in
Section 2. The main theorem, in which the playen are allowed to choose mrrelated mixed
actions, is presented in Section 3. Section 4 examines cases in which the folk theorem can be
achieved without correlated mixed actions. Conduding mmments are in Section 5.
2. The Model
2.1 The Single-Shot Game
The single-shot game is characterized by (N, S, P), where N-{1,..., n} is the set of
players, S, is the single-period pure strategy space of player i (the set of actions available to
player i in any period), S- X;ENS; is the single-period pure action space, Pi is the single-period
payoff function of player i, and P -(P,,..., P~. A pure action combination for the players inN`{i}, the n- 1 players other than player i, is denoted s,,,`~,}. The mrresponding action space is
denoted SM,,, - x}E,,,`{,~5~. We make the following rnmmon assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 1 N is finite.
ASSUMPTION 2 S; c Rm is mmpact and mnvex, i E N.
ASSUMPTION 3 P; is scalar valued and continuous on S, i E N.
We do not make the usual quasiconcavity assumption, which is used to ensure the existence of
a noncooperative equilibrium in the single-shot game, because this equilibrium plays no role in
our analysis. The critical punishment payoffs are minimax rather than equilibrium payoffs.
2.2 The Infinitely Repeated Game
The infinitely repeated game can now be formally expressed. Although the equilibrium
we examine has a stationary character, the players can use a succession of different dedsion
rules over time and strategy spaces must be formulated to take this into acrnunt. In
particular, for t? 1, player i can use any rule from the set V„ -{v;, ~ v;,:S' yS;}. As we assume
perfect monitoring (i.e., that each player knows at time t the actions taken by all players in the
past), the history of the game at time t, h, -(so,..., s,.,) E S`, is known to each player who is
then free to select any decision tvle from V,,. A typical strategy in the repeated game is then
01 -(SfO, Vilr V;Z,...) E Sixl~,~1VH -~,i. l,etting O- (~;,. , O~), VI - xfENVlI, 8nd L- xIEN~Ir
note that a strategy rnmbination, o E~„ induces a specific path of action rnmbinadons: u(o)
-(uo(o), u,(o),...) where uo(o) - sor ui(o) - v~(so) - v~(uo(o)), u~(o) - v2(uo(v). u~(o)).y
and, in general u,(o) - v,(uo(o),..., u,.,(o)).
Letting a- (a,,..., a") E (0, 1)" be the players' dismunt parameters, the repeated
game payoff functions are
G~(o) - Fi~oaip~(u,(o)) (1)
Letting G-(G,,..., G"), the game is then given by (N, ~„ G).
2.3 Minimax Payoffs
The minimax payoff of player i is defined as min,M~i~E~~ ymax,iE~P,(s,,,`~,},s,).' Let s' be
the action combination that minimaxes player i, so that v; - P;(s') and v-(v,,..., v"). Let
P(s') -(y'1,..., y;.,, v;, y;,,,...,yÁ) - y', so that P(s~) is the vedor of payoffs when player i is
minimaxed. Note that we do not know, in general, how a given y; (the payoff player i
receives when player j is being minimaxed) is related to v;. When minimaxing player j, player
i could receive a payoff either higher or lower than v;.
2.4 Reference Points
Let A„ - {x E R; ~ F~,ay - 1} be the unit simplex in R". The reference point is then
defined to be ~-(~o, ~,,..., ~") E[0,1] xA„ - Y. A payoff vector is associated with each
value of the reference point. The payoffs associated with various reference points can be
described by a family of line segments in payoff space, one for each n-vector (~,,..., ~"). These
line segments are intimately related to the minimax payoffs of the players and to the payoffs
that are sustained when there is no defec[ion.
It is help(ul to intuitively sketch this relationship. Let v ~~ x' and e~ 0. For each i E
N let w~ E S satisfy10
P(w') -(x~ t c..... x~-; t F. x„ x,,, t c...., x,; t c) a x'.
Then the expected payoff vedor supported by cooperative behavior (i. e., ~o - 1) is ~.,'~,~;P(~'),
under which player i receives ay t(1 -~;)e. Thus if player i has zero defector status (~3; - 0)
he gets e more than if he is the sole defector (~; - 1). At the other extreme, if zero
rnoperation (i. e., ~o - 1) is called for, then the expeded payoff vector is ~,~;P(s'). Figure 3
(place Figure 3 here)
provides an illustration. Let ~, -.8 and SZ -.2. If ~o - 1, then expected payoffs are at B;
however, if ~o - 0 expeded payoffs are at A. The broken line from A to B traces out the
expected payoff poinu as ~o goes from zero to one. At C, ~o -.6. More generally, given
~ E Y, the players adopt a correlated action mmbination, denoted ((~), under which they
play ~' with probability ~~; and s' with probability (1 -~~~; for each i E N. Given ~, the
expected payoff veMOr is ~-,~,[~oP(~') t(1 -~~P(s')j. For example at C in Figure 3 the
expected payoff to player 1 is .8(.6P(~')) t.8(.4P(s')) t.2(.6P(~~) t.2(.4P(s~).
3. The Continuous, Subgame Perfect Folk Theorem
3.1 Strateges
Because each value of the reference point designates a correlated mixed action and has
an associated expected payoff vector, specifying strategies is accomplished by specifying how
the reference point is determined. We begin by letting the initial value of the reference point
be given by ~o -(1, l~n,..., l~n). Then the transition of ~, into ~,t, can be specified. If no
defection took place at time t, then ~„ through ;8~, are unchanged, meaning that the defector
status of the players is unchanged. (I. e., ~,,,t, -~;, for i E N.) If ~a ~ 1, then ~o,t„ - W~a
t 1- p for W E(0,1), which is nearer to one. If there was defection in period t, then ~;,,, ?
~;, for the defectors; while, for the nondefectors, ~;,a, 5~,,. As long as ~n ~ 0 for some11
nondefedors, strict inequality will hold for such nondefectors and for all defedors.
Furthermore, the ~; of the nondefectors will be reduced in equal proportions. ALso, ~o.,,, will
be smaller than it would have been in the absence of a defection.
To see the preceding in detail, let Po(s) - max„ E~P,(s`u~ denote the maximum
deviation payoff for player i from s and let c(~,) denote the realization at time t of the random
mrrelated action mechanism (thus c(~,) E{s',..., s", v,',..., ~"} - St). Then zh, defined
below, is the normalized extra deviation payoff received by player i if he deviates form c(~,)
by choosing some s;, x c(~,):
P.(c(~,)~„) - P;(c(~,))
zi, - m~{
pqc(~,)) - R,(c(~,)) ~ O~
(2)
Note that z„ is normalized to measure extra payoff as a fraction of the largest possible extra
deviation payoff that the player rnuld have and, if s;, reduces the payoff of player i, the extra
deviation payoff is taken to be zero. Let
zo - ~,z;,, zM - max{l, zo}
z; - min{1, zo1.
Eqs. (3) and (4) below give the transition from ~, to ~,,,.
~;.,., -(1 - z;)~;, t z„~z,". i E N (3)
~o.~.i - max{0, W~a - zo f 1- W} (4)
Eq. (3) has the desiced proper[ies that (1) a player's defector status must be
nonnegative, (2) the sum over players is one, and (3) if one or more players defect when the
defectors' rnmbined defector statuses are less than one, then their mmbined defector status
rises while that of each nondefector falls to a fraction of its previous value. Eq. (4) assures
that the level of cooperation is between zero and one and that, following defection, the level12
of cooperation is lower than it would have been in the absence of defection. When there is
exactly one dcfector, then equations (3) and (4) bernme
~~.~, ~-(1 - T~,)i~i, t H, and I)o.,.~ - max{U. WQa - T„ t 1- p}.
Eqs. (2) to (4), expressing the mapping of (~„ s,) to ~,,,, define a function ~y:YxS-.Y.
LEMMA 1 The function ~y, defined by eqs. (2) to (4), is rnntinuous.
(5)
PROOF Each z„ is rnntinuous in (~„ s,); ~i;,,, is rnntinuous in (~,,, z,,,..., z,,,), i E N; and ~o,,,
is continuous in (~a, z,,,..., z,,,). O
We now construct equilibrium strategies. Using ~y, the equilibrium decision rule for
player i is to choose an action in time t from the se[ S~ -{~~,..., u~;", s;,..., si} according to a
commonly observed random mechanism with probability distribution (,(j3,) -(~Boj3,,,..., 5~,,,,
(1 -~~,)~,,..... (1 - áa)~~,) where ~r - ~y~(~3,.,, s,-,), j- 0,..., n. Thus r, - r~ for all players i
and j; the players use the same mixed action and they draw their actions by observing the
same random variable. This decision rule, along with the period zero action of player i, is the
(proposed) equilibrium strategy of the player. Thus the equilibrium strategy of player i is o; -
({;(~~, Z;(tlr(.))) and the equilibrium strategy rnmbination is denoted ó.
3.2 Equilibrium
These strategies provide a mntinuous folk theorem:
THEOREM 1. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, if x' ~~ v and an e-neighborhoods of x' is13
rnntained in the attainable payoff space of (N, S, P), there exist values of (a, p) E(0, 1)""
such that ó is a continuous subgame perfect equilibrium strategy combination for the
repeated game yielding an equilibrium payoff to player i in each period of xj f(1-l~n)E.
PROOF The sense in which the strategies of the players are rnntinuous is that each Zi is
rnntinuous in ~, and ~y is rnniinuous in (~,.,, s,.,). It remains to show that the strategy
mmbination ó is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Let II; - max,ESP;(s) denote the global maximum payoff to player i. Then the
maximum payoff to a player is bounded above by II{ -~;(1 -~~(II; - v;) for ~, E[0, 1].
Now rnnsider a deviation of relative size z5t - z by a single player, i, when the
reference point is ~. To simplify notation suppose that
Y - ~y:ÍiPi(~IE,~i.
w - ~ivi t ~xi~iPi(~) - áivi (1 - QaY
x - x; t (1 - ~,)e,
~ - f~i t z(1 - ~i)]vi t (1 - ~i)(i - z)Y - w - (1 - Ri)z(Y - vJ,
X - x; f (1 - Ri)(1 ' Z)E - x - (1 ' ~i)~,
Thus for fixed Sp j E N, w is the expected (one period) payoff to player i at ~o - 0 and x is
his expected payoff at ~o - 1. Using the expression for y, w-~,v, f(1 -~;)y. Following the
small deviation by player i of size z, ~; rises and the other ~i (j ~ 0, i) fall. The respective
counterparts of w and x, after ~ changes due to the deviation, are ~ and x'. The payoff for
player i with z- 0(i.e., if he followed the equilibrium prescription and did not deviate) is
Pi(c(J4o)) f F,:~ai[(1 - W(1 -~o))X t W~(1 -~o)w]
- p(c~o)) f[ ai aiP(1 -~o)lx t aiP(~
' 1-a; 1-a,p J 1-a,W
(6)14
and the maximum payoff player i rnuld receive as a result of deviating is
z[II; - ~~(1 - ~o)(~ - vi)] f (1 - z)P~(c(~o)) f
ai ai(k - k~o } Z) lz t
a~(W - W~o f Z)N,
~1 - a; 1- a;p J 1- a;p
The following inequality expresses the mndition that eq. (6) exceeds eq. (7) (i.e., deviation
payoff is less than nondeviation payoff):
zP;(c(~o)) - z[Q - ~~(1 - ~o)(II; - v;)] - a'z (~ - x')
1-a;W
(7)
t a~W(1 - ~o)(w - ~ } f ai aiV(1 - ~~~(x x,] , 0 (8)
1-a;p ll-a; 1-a;p
To show conditions under which eq. (8) holds, substitute into eq. (8) for x, x', w, and w'. It is
[hen seen that all terms are multiplied by z, which is always positive. Divide by z and
separate terms into those multiplied by ~; and those multiplied by (1 -~;). (f each of these
two groupings is positive then eq. (8) holds. Eq. (9) shows the ~, grouping with the terms
rearranged and eq. (10) shows a rearrangement of the (1 -~;) grouping. That the two
groupings are positive is equivalent to eqs. (9) and (10) holding; therefore, eqs. (9) and (10)
ii~iviy ey. (ó).
II; - P;(c(io)) - (1 - Qo)(II; - v;) c a~ (~5 - v;)
1 - a;p
~p ail(I~ - i~F~O -F Z)(y - V~ E) f]t; - y f E) a~E
11; - Pi(cWO1) - ~ -
1 - a;p 1 - a;
(9)
(10)
The left side of eq. (9) is bounded while the right side gces to infinity as (a;, p) goes
to (1, 1); therefore, there is a set of values of (a;, p) E(0, 1)~ for which eq. (9) holds. In
addition, if eq. (9) holds for (a;, p) E(0, 1)2 and (a;, W') E(0, 1)2 satisfies (a„ W7 Z(a;, p),15
then eq. (9) holds for (ai, ll'). Denote by A' c(0, 1)"" the set of values of (a, ~1) for which
eq. (9) holds for all i E N.
To see that eq. (10) holds for some (a;, p) E(0, 1)2 no[e, first tha[ the left side of eq.
(lU) is bounded above by a(W) for any given value of W E(0, 1). Let A" c(0, 1)"" be the set
of values of (a, p) for which eq. (10) holds for all i E N. Clearly A" is not empty because, for
given W, the left side is bounded by a(~1) irrespective of a; while the right side goes to infinity
as a; goes to one. Finally, let A- A'(lA". Then A is clearly nonempty and eq. (8) holds for
any (a, W) E A, proving the theorem.0
To provide some idea of what can happen in this framework, consider Figures 4 and 5.
Figure 4 is the situation that is intuitively expected. The payoff to both players is lower when
(place Figures 4 and 5 here)
one is being minimaxed (~o - 0) than when So - 1, irrespective of the values of~, and i4Z.
To see how the game proceeds, suppose that S, - 1 and ~z - 0, so that player 1 is the
defector. Then, depending on the value of ~o the players will randomiae between w' and s',
with the expected payoff lying on the edge going from P(s') to P(~'). IfSa - 1, then "full
l'UUPCI31llUll' IJ IIÍ Cllel'l, ~1VCIl t11C LCIaUVC UCÍeI'LUr JUftW Ul lÍle playelJ, allU play wiii proceed
at w' for payofffs of P(w'). If~o - 0 the players will receive payoffs of P(s') and if they
continue [o play with no defections, the expected payoff will proceed on the straight line to
P(rv').
Now suppose S, - y3 and ~, -'I3. The expected payoff would then be somewhere on
the broken line in Figure 4 running from A to B. The closer is ~o to unity, the closer will the
expected payoffs to A.
Next consider Figure 5. Here, the actions required to minimax player 1 provide player16
2 with a higher payoff than player 2 receives at c,~~. To see the potential difficulties which
then arise, suppose that ~, - 1 and that the players are currently randomizing between ~'
and s' so as to give an expected payoff at A. If player 2 should defed, then ~" decreases,
signaling a reduced degree of cooperation and ~2increases, signaling an increase in player 2's
defedor status. It is possible that the net effect of these two changes is to move the game to a
point such as B, wi[h 2's payoff rising. It is thus possible for ~" [o fall and ~2 [o rise, as
shown, with the ensuing payoff to player 2 still going up in the "punishment" phase as a
mnsequence of his defection. It is obvious that such a"punishment" will not deter player 2
from deviating. To rnnstitute an equilibrium, the strategies must be devised so that the payoff
to a defector falls after any defection. In Figure 5, this must be accomplished by ensuring
that, in the event of a deviation by player 2, ~, rises suffiriently rapidly relative to the fall in
~a. Much of the proof of Theorem 1 is mncerned with establishing this property.
4. Uncorrelated Strategies
The strategies used in the proof of Theorem 1 are constructed with the help of [he
assumption that players can rnrrelate their mixed strategies. In some games, this may not be
required.
Fix an outcome x' and fix e. Recalling the definitions of m' and s` in (2.4), let
H(x', e) -{x E R"~x -~-c.~~C~oP(~') } íl -~~p(s')l. ~ E Y}.
H(x', e) is thus the set of payoff vectors that rnuld be chosen by the strategy mmbinations
given in (5). Let H~ E R"" be the set of n t 1 tuples, (x',e), such that x' ~~ v and such that
there is a mnnected subset of S, denoted S(x', e), that P maps one-to-one onio H(x', e).
Hence, if (x', e) E H~, then every payoff in H(x', E) can be achieved by a pure stra[egy in17
S(x', e). Let x(~) -(x,(~),..., x"(~)) E S(x', e) denote the action combination that achieves
the payoff vector ~ E H(x', E). Thus, for ~ E Y, ~.(~) E S(x`, e) satisfies
P(Jl(Q)) - ~~iÍ~oP(~~) f (1 - ~o)P(s~)I (11)
Then let equilibrium strategies be given by
o~ - (~~(Ro). CJ
where
C~(R~) - ~~(R~) - x~(V~(~~-~. s,-,))-
(12)
(13)
1fie function ,l plays a central role in the cons[ruction of the equilibrium strategies and
important properties of ~L are established in the following lemma.
LEMMA 2 Let (x`, e) E H~ and, for~ E Y, let x(~) E S(x`, e) be defined by eq. (11). Then x
is defined, single-valued, and rnntinuous.
PROOF By construdion, for each ~ E Y there is a unique s E S(x', e) that satisfies eq. (11);
thus .l is defined on Y and is single-valued. Continuity of P, rnnnectedness of S(x', e), and
ci., ~i r,A a-.,.-,..,a ,..,.,, ui.. ~~ ..i., ~~.,. ~ r, . , , .....no .... ... ...... ....... ..~.. , ~~ `::r.~ ...... .. .., .,.,............... "
The statement of the folk theorem extension is now:
THEOREM 2. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, and given ~o E Y, if (x;, e) E H~,
then there exist values of (a, W) E(0, 1)"" such that ó is a rnntinuous subgame perfed
equilibrium strategy combination for the repeated game.1 z3
To prove Theorem 2, replace the definition of z;, given in eq. (2) by
~, - max ~ P'(D (á~)`su) - P;(x(~~)) Ol
P~ (A(Q~)) - Pi(1(~,)) J
(14)
and replace P;(c(~~) in eqs. (6) to (10) with Pi(~(~~). The proof of Theorem 2 then precisely
matches that of Theorem 1. Now, however, movements in payoff space are accomplished not
by varying the probabilities in a joint mixture over fixed strategies but by changing pure
stra[egies.
The question now naturally arises as to when H~ will be nonempry, so that Theorem 2
is not vacvous. H~ will be nonempty if (1) each payoff fundion P; is quasimncave on S, (2)
P~' is single-valued for all x in the range of P, and (3) v is interior to the payoff space.
Condition (1) assures that all payoffs in the set H(x', e) are attainable, mndition (2) assures
that there is a rnnnected subset of S that maps one-to-one onto H(x', e), and condition (3)
guarantees that nonempty sets H(z, e) exisL These are dearly quite strong rnnditions It
remains an open question as to what weaker assumpiions might imply or be equivalent to the
assumption that H~ is nonempty.
5. Concluding Cotnments
7heorems 1 and 2 present variant versions of the Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
extension of the folk [heorem for repeated games. Similar to Fudenberg and Maskin, we give
sufficient conditions for the existence of subgame perfect equilibria that support virtually any
individually rational payoff vector of the single shot game. Our equilibria differ in two key
ways. First, the supported points (x; f(1 - i~n)e, ..., x~ t(1 - t~n)e) may not include points
on the payoff frontier, although they can get arbitrarily close. Semnd, the equilibrium
strategies utilize mntinuous decision rvles.19
Friedman and Samuelson (1990a) examined analogs of trigger strategy equilibria
which potentially possessed a particular appeal as strategies that might arise without e~tplicit
coordination or preplay communicadon by the players. It is not so clear that the same
justification holds in the present mntext, because the strategies we develop are much more
complicated than their earlier munterparts. This is particularly true for those of Theorem 1,
which rely on correlated mixed actions. Nonetheless, we believe the exploration of mntinuous
strategies helps to round out the smpe of the resulu in the folk theorem family.?o
Notes
1. Finite reversion trigger strategies require a reference point that indicates whether a
defection has taken place within the preceding K periods where K is the number of
punishmen[ periods. Such a reference point would require more than two values; probably K
f 1 from the set {o, 1,..., K} where the value indicates the number of punishment periods that
remain.
2. Our results do not depend on the initial mndition ~i - I~n; however, a mmplete
description of the game requires that initial values be specified.
3. Clearly, if each p, is mncave in s and P maps S one-to-one onto the range of P, our
construction is assured. Suc2t rnnditions are extremely restrictive; they even exclude Cournot
duopoly with linear demand and constant marginal rnst.
4. In defining v, we implicitly assume N`{i} does not use mixed or mrrelated actions. If
N`{i} did, then the v~ might be smaller, but there would be no material change in the results.
The exposition is simpler this way. Correlated actions do play a critical role at another stage
of the development, so we use them there.
S. This is our rnunterpart of the full-dimensionality requirement of Fudenberg and Maskin
{7 OAf.~21
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